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Public & Private 
Ideal Types, Real Social Policies. Afterword 
As with many abstract heuristic terms, the real-world referents of “public” and “pri-
vate” – and the relationship between them – change over time and space. At times, 
“private” may refer to the family, home, and household, but it may also mean civil 
society and the realm of philanthropy, voluntary organizations, and the like, or even 
include the market, as opposed to “the state” or government. “Public” is generally 
thought to refer to the state (in all of its manifestations, from the local to the nati-
onal and even international organizations), but it may also invoke the market and 
even civil society when considered vis à vis the home. Thus, when studying Western 
Europe and North America during, say, the first half of the nineteenth century, his-
torians generally use private and public to distinguish between home, family, and 
household, on the one hand, and the expanding sphere of the market and civil soci-
ety on the other, with the state a distant third term. Surveying developments over the 
latter half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, however, historians are 
more likely to distinguish between a private sphere composed of expanding markets 
and civil societies (what Jürgen Habermas, confusingly, calls “the public sphere”) 
and a public sphere composed of expanding states, on the other.1
Yet, as the authors in this special issue argue, the distinctions were rarely that 
clear. Indeed, their articles shed light on moments in the history of public and pri-
vate in parts of Europe when the distinctions between them (if they in fact ever 
existed in pure form) appeared to be collapsing. In France, Germany and Switzer-
land in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Sonja Matter, Matthias 
Ruoss, Irma Gadient, Jürgen Schallmann, and Axelle Brodiez-Dolino argue, public 
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and private forms of social welfare constituted a “mixed economy of social welfare.” 
Charitable and governmental institutions appeared to claim equal status and exper-
tise when it came to social reform, as Chris Leonards discovered in his study of the 
penitentiary congresses held in London from 1880 to 1910. At the same time, the 
issue illustrates that the spheres of public and private were themselves in flux inter-
nally; as Michael Werner contends, the trajectory of private foundations in Ger-
many was “discontinuous” from the late nineteenth century through the twentieth, 
large ly due, of course, to the country’s tumultuous shifts from Empire to Reich. Yet, 
the emergence of strong welfare states in the twentieth century did not “crowd out” 
chari table organizations, Ruoss finds in Switzerland and Sarah Haßdenteufel in 
France and Germany. 
Persuasive as these articles are in demonstrating the instability of public and 
private, I would nevertheless suggest that it is worth considering these terms for a 
moment as distinct ideal types in order to understand what each might bring to the 
“mixed economy” and what is at stake when they become entwined. When we speak 
of the private sector of philanthropy and voluntary organizations, for example, we 
generally have in mind entities formed, run and financed by elites, initially upper-
class or even noble, but, over the course of the nineteenth century, increasingly mid-
dle-class. These organizations could be devoted to a number of issues including – as 
here – social welfare, but also to cultural, civic, and national causes. Then and now, 
voluntary organizations often earned praise not just for the generosity and vision of 
their donors, but also, especially when considered vis à vis their governmental coun-
terparts, for their flexibility and innovativeness – their ability to identify and address 
problems with alacrity, to adopt experimental approaches without becoming entan-
gled in government bureaucracies, but often leading to the creation of new govern-
ment programs and policies. And, as many gender historians have pointed out, vol-
untary organizations afforded women entrée into the public sphere at a time when 
their citizenship was otherwise severely limited.2
While acknowledging these strengths, critics of voluntary organizations also 
point to their limitations. Many, especially in the nineteenth century, have been reli-
giously based and motivated, their beneficence limited to adherents of specific deno-
minations. Many are erratically, even arbitrarily, funded, their very existence depen-
dent upon the whims of wealthy donors and/or the health of a particular economy 
(the latter risk, of course, not limited to private organizations). And the arbitrariness 
is not restricted to funding but can also determine the focus of voluntary organiza-
tions. Founders and leaders have the power to define their targets and set their prio-
rities, and while they may be constrained to some extent by the need to attract dona-
tions from the general public, the public has little input otherwise.3 Moreover, until 
fairly recently in many advanced market democracies, voluntary organizations have 
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operated with little governmental oversight or regulation while enjoying, as “non-
profits”, favoured tax status. Indeed, one might argue that by means of tax expenditu-
res – the taxes foregone on donations to non-profits – the public is, in effect, sup-
porting private charitable organizations and allowing them to set public priorities 
without democratic control. Finally, critics note, private charities seldom have the 
capacity to deal with large-scale national crises, such as economic depression or war.
Public institutions and agencies project a sharply contrasting image: they are 
seen as hide-bound and bureaucratic where private organizations are nimble, but 
they also rest on the broader financial base of the state and thus have the capacity 
to address national crises. Insofar as their mandates and policies are determined by 
legislatures, they are, of course, far more democratic than voluntary organizations, 
but that does not mean that all public welfare policies are universalistic – far from 
it. Indeed, we see crossovers and transfers from private to public when it comes to 
selectivity and “targeting”, not only in ideologies but also in practices; consider, for 
example, the treatment of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor by both charities 
and governmental agencies.4 
When it comes to women as policymakers and practitioners, government agen-
cies have been less hospitable than their private predecessors; as they “modernized”, 
adopting civil service standards and service norms, they substituted volunteers with 
trained professionals, often replacing women with men, especially in leadership 
positions (though in many countries, public social welfare agencies and branches 
of government devoted to social policy became, in effect, ghettos for female civil 
servants).5 Public and private agencies have taken different stances with regard to 
incorporating gender ideologies into their policies. In the early days of emerging 
welfare states, governments tended to absorb the conservative maternalist notions 
of female domesticity and motherhood that had undergirded many women’s volun-
tary organizations,6 but in later years, both public and private agencies could be seen 
to advance feminist principles through policies such as child care, maternity leave, 
and female labor force activation – sometimes with public agencies in the vangu-
ard, sometimes with private-sector feminist organizations prodding them to take 
action.7
Finally, there is the question of the relationship between public and private in terms 
of responsibility for social welfare. As sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen has poin-
ted out, the private and public sectors often engage in a kind of reciprocity, where by 
states sometimes take up the burden of providing services and benefits that are not 
offered by the private sector (namely the market – employers), while at other times, 
governments seek to fob off such responsibilities on the market through tax expen-
ditures for both individuals and corporations.8 This kind of reciprocity has, indeed, 
become the hallmark of twentieth- and twenty-first-century public-private or “resi-
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dual” welfare states. At the same time, in the U.S. and elsewhere, governments have 
been limiting their footprints by contracting out services to non-profit private-sector 
organizations. As political scientists Kimberly J. Morgan and Andrea Campbell point 
out, this type of “delegated governance” allows states “to respond to pressing social 
needs without seeming to expand the size of the federal government”9 – an especially 
important political maneuver in periods when opposition to governmental growth 
runs strong.10                                                                                                                                                                                                          
So what do these ideal types tell us about what is lost and what is gained in the 
“mixed economy of social welfare”? Do private-sector organizations lose their cri-
tical edge when their policies are taken up by the state, or they become public con-
tractors? Or does the ability to reach a broader swath of the public and perhaps gain 
financial stability make it worth the sacrifice of autonomy? From the opposite per-
spective, does the public lose its power to set priorities and exert oversight when 
governments delegate responsibility to private contractors and foundations, or do 
the gains in efficiency and agility outweigh the loss of democratic control? Clearly, 
each case will be different, but the articles in this issue begin to answer such questi-
ons by engaging in the kind of detailed probing and careful reflection that histori-
cal investigation allows, thereby expanding our understanding of the origins of the 
mixed economy of social welfare and the patterns that have emerged as public and 
private engaged in a complex pas de deux over the ensuing decades.
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